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Abstract  
 
Despite a long history of research on political budget cycles, their existence and magnitude 
are still in question. By conducting a systematic analysis of the existing literature we intend 
to clarify the debate. Based on data collected from over 1.700 regressions and 57 studies, 
our meta-analysis suggests that leaders do manipulate fiscal tools in order to be re-elected 
but to an extent that is significantly exaggerated by scholars. However, we show the 
incumbents’ strategy differs depending on which tools they leverage. Finally, we discuss in 
further details how authors’ methodological choices and country institutions affect political 
budget cycles. 
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1. Introduction
Whether elected leaders use their incumbency advantage to distort policy-making to serve
their own interests is a central concern in political economics. In particular, leaders may adopt
strategic-timing decisions in a way that help them to hold office. Since Nordhaus (1975), a large
-and still increasing- number of studies have scrutinized how leaders behave when elections get
closer. Despite significant heterogeneity, many studies have shown that incumbents “try to make
the year before an election a ‘happy one’ in order to be re-elected” consistently with Paldam’s
(1979) expectations. In the present paper we concentrate on fiscal tools manipulation as most
of the political cycles literature has progressively turned to (Shi and Svensson, 2003).1
Since cycles are not different from shocks affecting budget, they are likely to hurt the economy
(Fata´s and Mihov, 2003). Smoothing the policy-making over the representatives’ terms should
offer more economic stability and benefit the broader interest (Alesina and Perotti, 1994). Fur-
thermore, cycles reflect imperfections of institutions and democracy. For these reasons, it is
critical to better understand the patterns and mechanisms of electorally-driven manipulation of
public accounts. We believe this paper to contribute to this aim and eventually helping build
institutions that benefit the populations’ will.
Considering the substantial size of the so-called political budget cycles (PbCs) literature,
researchers have regularly offered some literature reviews (Shi and Svensson, 2003; Eslava, 2011;
de Haan and Klomp, 2013).2 These reviews provide updated overviews and try to draw general
conclusions from the various and fragmented pieces of work they put together. They consti-
tute significant milestones of the research on the area, help to synthesize it and finally offer
or suggest further developments for scientists. However, literature reviews only provide partial
panoramas of the existing literature, that are likely to be biased and distorted towards the au-
thors’ ideological positions (Stanley, 2001). Studies not conform to the authors’ opinion may be
“unintentionally” sidelined or purely disregarded. A second limit of literature reviews resulting
from the latter point is the limited information-added they deliver. Literature reviews present
and organize researches that have been undertaken so far but do not reveal any additional in-
1Cazals and Sauquet (2015), or Dubois (2016) argue that cycles are more likely to occur on instruments, such
as fiscal policy, rather than on outcomes of economic policy, such as employment, growth or inflation. Their
suggestion would explain why the literature has been increasingly focused on political budget cycles rather than
political business cycles.
2Similar reviews on political business cycles can be found in the literature (Drazen, 2001, among others).
4
Études et Documents n° 9, CERDI, 2016
sight. In other words, classic narrative reviews are not able to resolve nor explain apparent
divergences among scholars’ empirical findings in a rigorous way.
In an attempt to offer a clearer picture of the vast amount of research on the PbCs literature,
we provide a meta-regression analysis (MRA). MRA allows going beyond the two limits of
literature reviews above-mentioned. First, MRA relies on a systematic review of the existing
literature. As a consequence, it encompasses all studies produced to date on a specific issue. No
matter how well a study matches with the MRA author’s ideology, it receives the same weight
as the other studies collected. Second, MRA consists in carrying out a statistical analysis of the
findings from the collected studies. The regression-based analysis is expected to produce some
new insights into the considered issue, especially regarding heterogeneities and discrepancies
observed in the literature.
To implement the MRA, we first performed a broad and meticulous investigation of the
literature resulting in a selection of 57 papers. All these papers share specific inclusion charac-
teristics.3 In particular, they all provide a cross-country analysis of how the level of any budget
variable (share or total of public revenue, public expenditures, or fiscal surplus) is modified
around elections.4 We then coded the 1, 726 regressions extracted from our collection and built
our own original dataset summarizing the empirical findings from the PbCs literature . This
paper presents the results of their statistical analysis. The MRA developed suggests that in
average leaders do manipulate the budget before elections, though at a moderate rate. Our
results also reveal this rate is fairly exaggerated in the literature.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the literature and its
most debated issues. Section 3 describes the data we use for conducting the statistical analysis.
Section 4 provides preliminary evidence. Section 5 discusses our approach and the methodology.
Sections 6 to 10 present the MRA results and the last section concludes.
2. Theoretical predictions
A meta-analysis offers a toolkit allowing in the best case to solve conflicting theoretical
and/or empirical findings on a specific research question.5 Concerning PbCs, the theory is
3see Section 3.1.
4We refer indifferently to “budget” or “fiscal” variable. So we do for the terms “expenditures” and “spending”.
5One of the most famous example refers to the labor market effects of the minimum-wage. Contrary to the
neo-classic predictions and conventional belief, meta-analyses reveal no significant negative association between
minimum-wage and employment (Card and Krueger, 1995; Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2009, for instance).
5
Études et Documents n° 9, CERDI, 2016
rather unambiguous. It states that incumbents have an incentive to distort policy-making before
elections in order to please and incite voters to renew them at office (Rogoff, 1990).6 Empirical
findings are however more contrasting. In particular, the existence and magnitude of such
predicted cycles seem to vary according to factors such as geography, or institutional settings.
In other words, the manifestation of PbCs is heterogeneous and conditional (Wittman et al.,
2006). de Haan and Klomp (2013) provide an excellent and updated review of conditioning
variables examined in the literature, such as the level of development, the quality of institutions,
democracy characteristics, and constitutional features. Another concern is the ability to properly
observe such manipulation, which is by nature a hidden phenomenon, through the use of “too
much” aggregated data across time and space (Labonne, 2016).
In addition, some scholars question the effectiveness of such strategic manipulation. Several
country-specific studies show that incumbents that resort to PbCs have a lower probability to
be re-elected. This phenomenon is evidenced by Peltzman (1992) for the United States, Brender
(2003) for Israe¨l, Drazen and Eslava (2010) for Colombian mayors, and Brender and Drazen
(2007) in a worldwide cross-country study.7 If voters punish rather than reward incumbents
running fiscal expansions before elections, then there should be no point adopting such strategies.
Arvate et al. (2009) dissect this paradox and explain that strategic manipulation of fiscal
tools is more rewarding when voters are less sophisticated and informed. Unsurprisingly, PbCs
are more pronounced in developing countries (Shi and Svensson, 2006), regimes with low levels
of democracy (Gonzalez, 2002)8 and new democracies (Brender and Drazen, 2005), where voters
are usually less informed and experienced, and where thus manipulation is expected to be more
effective.
3. The meta-data
Basically a MRA breaks down in three stages. The first one is the collection of all the relevant
studies that meet set of predefined objective criteria. The second and most time-intensive step
is the coding of the estimates encompassed in theses studies resulting in a dataset ready to be
6Here we do not discuss here the underlying mechanisms, such as competency signaling process, trickery of
short-sighted voters or targeting of swing voter groups.
7On the other hand, the literature is far from unanimity on the detrimental effects of PbCs on incumbents
chances of reelection. Instead, Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008) and Jones et al. (2012), among others, find
beneficial effects for Brazilian mayors and Argentinean governors respectively.
8Gonzalez (2002) finds higher PbCs during the democratization process of Mexico, i.e. when Mexico had a
low-level democratic framework.
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exploited. The third and last part is the statistical analysis of this dataset. We discuss the first
two steps in this section. Unlike standard empirical studies, MRA does not rely on primary data
such as GDP or household income. Rather we must dedicate much care and effort to build our
own dataset, which is critical to ensure its quality and the consistency of our results.
3.1. How did we select the studies?
The present meta-analysis relies on 1, 331 estimates (selected over a total of 1, 726) with
available partial correlations, extracted from 57 papers (see Table A.8). This selection is the
result of an extensive search and the adoption of restrictive requirements.
First, we implement the search on the most comprehensive electronic search engines, that
is: EconLit, Science Direct, Ideas Repec, Springer, Wiley and Google Scholar, by entering
the keywords “political budget cycle”, “political business cycle”, and “electoral cycle” in these
bibliographic databases. As some relevant studies may fall through the cracks, we undertake
a manual complementary search. First, we look for additional studies in the references listed
in the papers already selected. Second, we check the publications and working papers of the
authors identified in the first round.9 Finally, we attempt to be as exhaustive as possible, with
alternative web engines. If any relevant study was to remain, we believe its omission is not
likely to affect our analysis since it relies on a substantial number of estimates and the potential
“missed” ones would be randomly omitted. We then refined our selection and only keep studies
that are both relevant and allow a consistent statistical analysis, as described hereafter.
We only retain empirical cross-sectional papers written in English. A study with no regression-
based estimate is discarded de facto. This is the case of most theoretical papers and literature
reviews. In the empirical papers thus selected, we only retain original estimates10 that are
based on at least two countries. Single-country regressions often dig deeper in the theoretical
mechanisms supporting political cycles. In particular, the analysis of economic and political
institutions can be much finer, as it is often a real challenge to compare and collect data for
comparable variables for different countries. As a result, single-country regressions are likely to
yield estimates that are too country-specific to be comparable with estimates stemming from
9This manual search only reveals few supplementary papers, hence accrediting the effectiveness of the electronic
round of the selection.
10We do not keep estimates reported or replicated from another source. Multiple-counting of the same regression
would artificially inflate its weight, that is, it would bias our results. Actually we did collect estimates reported
multiple times. Such cases are scarce, and unsurprisingly do not affect our results. For a matter of relevance, we
only present results after having removed multiple-counting.
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cross-sectional papers. Moreover, they would have implied dissecting all studies whatever the
language in which they are written (Spanish, French, Chinese, Hindi, Russian, and so on). If
quantifiable, the amount of work would have been much more considerable than it has already
been (and than all MRA require), and risks related to omissions, such as hidden literature on a
specific language, significantly higher. Unsurprisingly however, we met a limited number of such
estimates during our data collection. A consistent estimate of PbCs requires a large number
of elections, and thus in the case of a single-country estimate a large temporal dimension. In
turn, this leads to a problem of data availability and reliability. This methodological choice
slightly limits our sample of estimates, which is not a major concern in our case since we rely on
1, 726 estimates. To sum up, we believe the potential benefits of incorporating country-specific
estimates in our analysis are not worth the risks of omission and biases, and the costs in terms
of time that it incurs.
As most of the economic science is released in English, we are not likely to omit much
relevant studies. For similar reason we only retain estimates from scientific paper-formatted
study, whether published or not. We thus omit estimates from books, reports or even theses.
Indeed, the latter are less frequently numerically released and accessible, and often results from
books are also spread in papers, so that we eventually catch the relevant data they may contain.11
Additionally, we only consider papers which focus on how electoral periods affect the level
of either national deficits, revenue or expenditure, or a subdivision of one of these three broad
fiscal variables. Consequently, estimates whose the dependent variable is some sort of budget
composition change index are not considered.12 As the theory essentially predicts the behavior
of leaders before elections and not after, almost all regressions found in the literature focus on
pre-electoral cycles. Due to scarcity of both theoretical and empirical research on post-electoral
patterns (de Haan and Klomp, 2013), we restrict our attention to estimates of fiscal manipulation
during the run-up to elections.
Finally, based on all these criteria of inclusion, we updated and limited our search to studies
released strictly before January 1st 2015. On the 1, 726 regressions coded, we remove estimates
that do not offer the minimal statistical information required by MRA, that is partial correlations
11A notable example is the Persson and Tabellini’s (2003b) book, whose the results may be found in companion
papers (Persson, 2002; Persson and Tabellini, 2003a).
12This is typically the case of Brender and Drazen’s (2013) paper. The information delivered by such a study
is meaningful, but we are not able to put together level and composition change indices in a consistent way in our
analysis.
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and standard errors or t-statistics. We finally end up with a sample of 1, 331 estimates.
3.2. Measures of the dependent variable
As stated above, we only retain estimates featuring a fiscal output variable as the dependent
variable, indifferently expressed in level, as a nominal value, as a fraction (of GDP most of the
time), as a variation or growth rate. We thus exclude regressions based on changes in budget
composition (Ashworth and Heyndels, 2002; Brender and Drazen, 2013, for instance). Therefore,
we also discard cases where the dependent variable is a ratio of a sub-component of a budget
variable over this budget variable. For instance, in some regressions, Katsimi and Sarantides
(2012) use the ratio “current (or capital) spending / total spending”. In such cases, we observe
the variation of the ratio but we are not able to identify if this variation results from an electoral
manipulation on the numerator, the denominator, or both. As a consequence we cannot know
how the level of current (or capital) expenditure is affected by the closeness of elections. Similar
cases of composition-related regressions that were excluded from our sample may be found in
Chang (2008), Vergne (2009), or Klomp and de Haan (2013a), among others. Some papers use
cyclically adjusted measures (Golinelli and Momigliano, 2006; Stanova, 2009; Moura˜o, 2011, for
instance), but interestingly none relies on a discretionary measure of fiscal output, with the
exception of Buti and Van Den Noord (2004).
The literature splits budget variables into three, even if numerous studies compare (succes-
sively) the effect of elections on all three of them. A first set of estimates we code focuses on
expenditure patterns. Most of them rely on the level of public expenditure divided by GDP (275
estimates over 1, 331). However, we find eight other finer measures based on sub-components
of expenditure, in particular current, capital, broad, and local spending. All these four mea-
sures are generally expressed as a share of GDP. Exceptions are Potrafke (2010) and Klomp and
de Haan (2013a) that use per capita for health and agriculture expenditure respectively. Voters
are expected to be more sensitive to current rather than capital expenditure as their effects are
more tangible in the short term. Therefore leaders should be more prompt in increasing current
spending in pre-electoral period. According to the prevailing electoral system, leaders may also
privilege manipulating (broad) welfare spending or (finer) local expenditures targeting specific
groups such as swing voters as a strategic tool.
A second set of estimates assesses how leaders manipulate public revenue according to elec-
toral periods. Once again, authors’ favorite variable is aggregate public revenue over GDP (196
9
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estimates out of 1, 331). We include estimates using 13 other measures that are sub-components
of overall revenue, normalized by the GDP. These alternative variables are essentially specific
kind of taxes, that are likely to be more easily or effectively manipulated by leaders. We do
not intend to be exhaustive and provide overwhelming details on these measures and the related
studies here, but some descriptive statistics are summarized in Tables A.9 and A.10.13
The third set contains estimates of how elections impact the national budget surplus, which
is obtained by subtracting public expenditures from public revenue. Numbers of studies focus
on deficits rather than surpluses. In this case, we multiply estimate values by minus one (−1) so
that this last set contains only estimates of the effect of elections on budget surplus over GDP.
Finally, 913 estimates over 1, 331 use one of the three main variables, that is the nominal
value of either surplus, expenditure or revenue on GDP. The number of papers focusing on one
category of fiscal ouptut is relatively limited (except when considering fiscal surplus, see Tables
A.9 and A.10 for more details). Unsurprisingly, the analysis based on the whole sample (1, 331
estimates) the one based on the reduced sample (913 estimates) yield similar results.
3.3. Measures of election variables
Authors have multiplied the ways of taking account of electoral manipulations. In particular,
their challenge is to capture electoral periods in an accurate and relevant manner (Akhmedov
and Zhuravskaya, 2004). To do so, they develop and compute electoral period variables of various
forms. The most common is a dummy taking the value of one in years during which an election
occurs, or alternatively the year before it takes place.14 In order to better capture leaders’
behavior during the year preceding elections, scholars have offered various adjustments to this
“electoral year dummy”, such as coding one pre-electoral year rather than several electoral years
when the ballot occurs in the first x months of the civil year (Shi and Svensson, 2006), or by
distinguishing elections according to the period of the year during which they occur (Brender
and Drazen, 2005; Mink and de Haan, 2006).15 Another class of refinements is pioneered by
Franzese (2000). With this method, the electoral variable is intended to measure how much of
a given year may actually been considered as pre-electoral. Considering an election taking place
13A list of each considered sub-component of spending and revenue is available upon request.
14Even though most authors are interested in pre-electoral periods, some studies focus on post-electoral years
and may use interest variable in the form of a binary variable equaling one in years following a civil year during
which a ballot has occured (Block, 2002; Persson and Tabellini, 2003a; Alt and Lassen, 2006; Ebeke and O¨lc¸er,
2013, among others).
15Most of the time, these techniques are employed as robustness or sensitivity tests.
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during the mth month of year, the electoral variable equals
m
12
the electoral year, and
12−m
12
the
year before. Alternative measures derived from the generic ones presented here may be found
in the literature. But beyond the measure, scholars also question the nature of elections.
For instance, Klomp and de Haan (2013a,b,d) remove anticipated elections and focus explic-
itly on predetermined ones in order to avoid endogeneity issues related to the timing of elections.
Another concern is which elections to consider. Usually two kinds of elections are of national im-
portance, namely parliamentary and presidential ones.16 Facing the arbitrariness of the choice,
some authors such as Fata´s and Mihov (2003) do not distinguish between the two types and pay
attention to all elections, with the risk of a high frequency of elections and the lack of relevant
focus. Other papers focus on one given kind of elections considered by the authors as more
meaningful for all the countries of their sample (Hagen, 2007, for instance).17 Yet, according
to constitutional design of countries, one kind of elections or the other may exert greater forces
on the policy-making and thus may be more relevant regarding the issue of political cycles. A
last group of authors thus chose to use what is considered as the highest election according to
the country (Shi and Svensson, 2006, for instance): parliamentary elections for parliamentary
systems and presidential elections for presidential systems.
4. At first glance
Because they offer a first answer to the economic question raised at a glance, funnel graphs
have become very popular in MRA. In our framework, a funnel graph consists in plotting a
measure of the precision of the estimates of election effect on fiscal aggregates (vertical axis)
against these estimates collected from the literature (horizontal axis). Most of the time, precision
is measured by the inverse of the standard error of the estimate ( 1SE ). In other words, funnel
plots provide an illustration of how the estimates are distributed. Most of the estimates lie at
the bottom of the graph. They are by definition not precise and they vary across a wide range
of estimate values. Moving to the top, more precise estimates appear to be concentrated around
a precise value. This value is supposed to reflect the “true” genuine effect of elections on fiscal
16In semi-presidential systems, parliamentary elections are called legislative elections. Interestingly semi-
presidential systems are generally treated as parliamentary systems in the literature, due to the vote of confidence
for governments (Persson and Tabellini, 2003b, for instance).
17Others adopt mixed strategies by retaining only presidential systems and focusing on presidential elections
(Block, 2002; Hanusch and Vaaler, 2013), or parliamentary systems and considering parliamentary elections (Bayar
and Smeets, 2009).
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aggregates. If the distribution is centered on zero, we should conclude that elections have no
effect on such aggregates. A second information we may infer from such graphs is the potential
selection bias from the literature. In the absence of such a bias, points should be symmetrically
distributed around this “true” effect. In short, the funnel graphs displayed in Figures 1 to 4 show
us that leaders manipulate budget before elections and that researchers make this effect bigger
than it actually is.
For the funnel we design, partial correlations are preferred to regression coefficients as these
are sensitive to alternative measures and scales of election and fiscal variables. To ensure com-
parability across the estimates, we convert the coefficients we collected into partial correlations
as follows:
r =
t√
t+ df
(1)
where t is the t-statistic and df the degrees of freedom of each estimate collected. If the sample
size is almost always reported by authors, it is rarely the case for degrees of freedom. Fortunately,
partial correlations are weakly sensitive to imprecise degrees of freedom calculations (Stanley
and Doucouliagos, 2012); this uncertainty is especially marginal as sample sizes in the PbCs
literature consist of hundreds even thousands of observations. This standardization removes the
economic meaning of the effects but is still informative on the magnitude and sign of associations
between election and fiscal aggregates and makes them quantitatively comparable. By way of
robustness, we also implement the widely used Fisher’s partial correlation transformations.18
Figure 1 reports the distribution of partial correlations (left panel) and Fisher’s partial cor-
relations (right panel) between elections on public spending based on 535 regressions coded.
Consistent with the theory, the “true” value of the manipulation of public expenditures, sug-
gested by the top of the distribution is positive, yet close to zero. Moreover, if most estimates
reveal a positive manipulation, this is partly explained by a clearly right-skewed distribution.
Not so similar conclusions can be drawn from the funnel graph of correlations between elections
and public revenue (Figure 2). The distribution is not skewed to the left suggesting a selection
bias in favor of results reporting a reduction in public revenue in pre-electoral periods. However,
the “true” value of manipulation of this aggregate is here less clearly on the left of the zero-line.
This may translate a lesser ability of leaders to modify tax rates and/or a weak sensitivity of
18We apply the formula: z =
1
2
ln
1 + r
1− r . See Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012), for a discussion.
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voters to revenue cuts. Since leaders tend to increase spending and slightly reduce revenue when
elections get close, Figure 3 unsurprisingly reveals a degradation of the budget surplus preceding
ballots. Selection bias appears, once again, distinctly. Figure 4 offers a global view on leaders’
manipulation of fiscal tools. In this figure we recode the correlations involving revenue and
surplus by multiplying them by minus one (−1), so that we can consistently combine the three
previous graphs into one funnel graph. It provides further evidence regarding a “true” manip-
ulation from leaders, together with a positive skweness of the distribution (0.31), translating
selection bias from scholars.
Then, we look at the distribution of the t-statistics of the estimates reported in the literature.
Figure 5 shows that t-statistics are concentrated around two (2) in absolute value consistent
with the expected sign of the association between elections and budget components. That is,
t-statistics are concentrated around the standard threshold of statistical significance at 5%. It is
then hard to believe this concentration around this specific value that we found in the four panels
of Figure 5 to be a pure coincidence. Rather, we suspect this reveals a tendency of researchers
to select the results they report, that is statistically significant effects.
Before turning to a more rigorous statistical and quantified analysis, graphical tools can
(still) offer us additional information on these two insights. Concerning the magnitude of leaders’
manipulation, a chronological ordering of the mean estimate of partial correlations -from each
paper of our collection- is provided in Figure 6 and reveals a clear declining trend in time.
Earlier papers report stronger budget manipulation than more recent studies. The decline is
strong since the mean estimate is more than halved over 1992 − 2014.19 This result may have
two main sources, or combination of both. First, budget manipulation may have declined over
time, and more recent papers, logically report weaker economic effects. Second, researchers may
have been less prone to inflate the magnitude of the effects they report. In other words, we know
the reported effects of pre-electoral budget manipulation have declined over time, but we are
not sure who deserves the credit.
19Interestingly, the 2008 trough is actually driven by the estimates from one paper whose electoral variable
capturing PbCs is not the variable of interest but control variable. At this stage however, we cannot know if this
translates a lesser attempt to find a large PbCs effect or a model specification not suitable to properly identify
that precise effect.
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Figure 1: Funnel plot of election-on-spending partial correlations (n = 535)
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Figure 2: Funnel plot of election-on-revenue partial correlations (n = 354)
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Figure 3: Funnel plot of election-on-fiscal surplus partial correlations (n = 442)
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Figure 4: Funnel plot of election-on-all fiscal output (adjusted) partial correlations (n = 1, 331; skewness = 0.31)
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Figure 5: Distribution of t-statistics
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Notes: Upper-left quadrant: Distribution of t-statistics on spending. Upper-right quadrant: distribution of t-statistics on revenue. Lower-left
quadrant: Distribution of t-statistics on fiscal surplus. Lower-right quadrant: distribution of t-statistics on all outputs (inverse t-statistics for
revenue and fiscal surplus).
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The graphical analysis conducted in this section seems to suggest evidence of manipulation
from both political leaders and researchers. The following section relies on a more rigorous
statistical analysis that allow digging deeper the findings, dissect the effects and quantify them
more precisely.
5. MRA methodology
To gain more rigorous insights into the manipulation controversy, we let the data speak by
turning to a standard model of simple meta-regression. Basically, it consists in regressing the
partial correlations between elections and budget variables on a intercept and its standard errors:
rij = β0 + β1SEij + εij , (2)
where r and SE denote the ith computed partial correlation and standard error from study
j and ε are the residuals. Through the estimation of β1 and β0, such a model allows testing
respectively for funnel-asymmetry and precision-effect. Conventional statistic theory assumes in-
dependence between the magnitude of estimated effects and its standard errors. Any significant
association, reflected by a β1 statistically different from zero, would reveal a tendency to favor
estimates with a certain t-statistic, likely exceeding the standard threshold of statistical signifi-
cance.20 Such a tendency is acknowledged as publication selection. Its causes are numerous and
deeply anchored to academic incentives of scholars (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012) who tend
to select results that best fit their ideology or conventional belief and offer greater opportunities
of publication. In the case of PbCs, we suspect that authors favor results reporting incumbents’
strategic behavior and thus we expect some positive and significant association between the
magnitude of the manipulation and its standard error, as suggested by the right-skewed funnel
graph in Figure 4.21 If so, the literature would be biased and the budget-distording effect of
elections overestimated.
Since Equation (2) controls for potential publication selection, its intercept, β0 reveals the
genuine effect of elections, if any. This effect is not anymore inflated or distorted by researchers’
20Card and Krueger (1995) show that the t-statistics of studies assessing the effect of the minimum-wage on
employment gravitate around two, approximation of the statistical significance at the usual 5% confidence level.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from empirical effects reported by best journals (Brodeur et al., 2016).
21When a strategic behavior leads to a deterioration of an aggregate, such as budget balance or public revenue,
the funnel is likely to be left-skewed and β1 negative.
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selection. Determining this genuine effect is a critical task of MRA as conflicting results in a
literature fail to do so. In our case, it should reveal if and to what extent leaders are likely to
manipulate fiscal tools to boost their reelection prospects. However, a simple meta-regression
may not be fully satisfactory. As reviewed by de Haan and Klomp (2013), scholars’ disagreement
does not lie in the existence of PbCs anymore but rather in the conditions of their existence
and magnitude. To examine the conditional nature of PbCs inherent to all socio-economic
phenomenon, we then turn to multiple meta-regressions. We augment Equation (2) by adding
a vector Z of k covariates:
rij = β0 +
K∑
k=1
βkZki + β1SEij + εij , (3)
Additional covariates allow assessing how PbCs differ across countries and over time, and how
authors’ methodological choices affect them. The list of explanatory variables used in the study is
provided in Table B.12. We organize them in nine categories: measure of fiscal output; measure
of the election variable; adjustments on the election variable; methodology employed; model
structure; decades and regions included; publication outlet and covariates included.
6. Basic results
We estimate Equation (2) and present results in Tables 1 and 2. This standard MRA regres-
sion is acknowledged as FAT-PET, that stands for funnel-asymmetry (β1) and precision-effect
(β0) tests. In Table 1, we combine all fiscal outputs to observe leaders’ manipulation in general.
Panel (i) reports the results on all available observations. In panel (ii) we exclude observations
dealing with subcomponents of revenue and spending. In other words we remove cases of what
the literature refers to as“pork barrel” (Drazen and Eslava, 2006) to solely focus on manipulation
of the broad fiscal outputs.22 Finally, panels (iii) and (iv) exclude conditional PbCs, captured
with interactive models or sub-sampling. In the first three rows of each panel we employ weighted
least squares (WLS) using precision squared as the weight. Precision squared is the inverse vari-
ance, which produces “optimal” weights in meta-analysis (Hedges and Olkin, 1985). By tackling
the heteroskedasticity issue, WLS are suitable for MRA and routinely employed by researchers
(Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). WLS do not treat all observations equally and assign more
22“Pork barrel” is often assimilated to targeted infrastructure projects, but it can also refers to pre-electoral
increase in some current expenditure, such as agriculutural subsidies.
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weight to estimates that are reported more precisely. We then replicate each regression: by clus-
tering on studies, by double clustering on studies and fiscal output, and finally employ robust
regression to control for the effects of potential outliers.23
As the introduction of the variable “standard error” (SE) in the econometric model captures
potential selection bias, the constant (β0) reveals the genuine effect of how leaders manipulate
budget in the run-up period to elections. Table 1 shows that this coefficient ranges from 0.021
to 0.033. The size of the association is rather limited, according to Cohen (1988), but strongly
significant and impels us to conclude that leaders do use budget tools to increase their popularity
before elections, thus creating PbCs. This strategy is not illegal per se but consists in fooling
short-sighted or non-informed voters in the short run to serve leaders’ own self interest at the cost
of a smooth and more sustained policy benefiting the broad interest. Such a political strategy
thus deviates from the ideal of democracy, and leaders employing it are likely to act as discreetly
as possible. Similar to corruption, manipulation of budget is typically a hidden phenomenon.
Given the very nature of such phenomenon, finding any evidence of it, even small in magnitude,
is to be considered carefully both for economic efficiency and institutional quality reasons. On
the other hand, the first column of Table 1 report the value of β1 and its associated standard
error, that indicates the strength of selection bias if any. This coefficient is strongly statistically
significant. Ranging from 0.638 to 0.917, this effect can be considered as substantial based on
Doucouliagos and Stanley’s (2013) guidelines. This suggests that results reported by researchers
in this literature are fairly inflated. We do not claim that scholars always and deliberately
manipulate their results. We observe a general tendency to over-report some specific results,
that leads us to conclude that the results from the PbCs literature are on average distorted
even manipulated by researchers.24 Somewhat ironically, we also note that the magnitude of
the research bias is actually much bigger than the one associated to budget manipulation by
leaders.25
23This last estimator is also acknowledged as the precision-effect estimate with standard errorS (PEESE) es-
timator and is shown to be the best option when a genuine effect exists beyond selection bias (Stanley and
Doucouliagos, 2012).
24Interestingly, the same logic applies for leaders. We only observe an average tendency that does not imply
that all leaders use budget manipulation every time and every where. Furthermore, a budget deterioration before
elections may have sound economic grounds in some cases, but this phenomenon occurs (too) frequently to be
pure coincidence or driven for or by economic reasons.
25Research bias is pervasive and present in most bodies of literature within and beyond economics. To put our
findings in perspective, although the publication selection bias is substantial, many MRA present magnitude of
bias in other fields of research even much stronger (see Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012)).
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Finally, based on the heterogeneous existing estimations to date and once the selection bias
removed, it appears that on average there is still a small but statistically robust evidence of
manipulation. This first result answers the debate around the existence of PbCs, but is mute
when it turns to explain what are their origins.
[insert Table 1]
7. Where do PbCs come from?
Table 2 displays the FAT-PET results for each group of fiscal output selected as the de-
pendent variable. We report results for a broad measure of spending encompassing all types of
expenditure (panel (i)), and a narrow measure of spending excluding subcomponents of total
spending (panel (ii)). We apply the same logic to revenue in panels (iii) and (iv). Finally, panel
(v) reports results when fiscal surplus is used to capture fiscal cycles. Again, the results show
strong evidence of publication selection bias consistent with: the effect of elections is positive
on spending and negative on revenue and fiscal surplus. Interestingly, we do not find strong
evidence of pre-electoral manipulation on revenue and spending (panel (i) to panel (iv)), but we
do find a statistically significant and robust manipulation on fiscal surplus. This may suggest
possible heterogeneity in the strategies employed by leaders. Depending on the political easiness
and pay-off that leaders face in their countries, they may favor manipulation of spending rather
than revenue. In different contexts, leaders maximize their re-election prospects by adopting
a spending-strategy or a revenue-strategy, or even a mixed strategy by manipulating both ag-
gregates. If the strategy choice is not clear because context-dependent, what is clear is that
the primary balance systematically deteriorates before elections. The pre-electoral deficit rise
reflects the opportunism of leaders although the fiscal tools they leverage are different.26
To assess even more finely the behavior of leaders, we offer to go one step further and look
inside each box: expenditure and revenue. Table 3 reports the estimated effect of electoral
manipulation by disaggregating the different fiscal tools. Columns 1 and 2 present results when
revenue are used, and columns 3 and 4 when spending are used. In even columns we use the
fixed effects multilevel (FEML) estimator that includes dummy variable for individual authors
26This result echoes back the work of Barberia and Avelino (2011) on Latin American countries.
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to take into account unobserved heterogeneity among authors in the PbCs literature, with less
bias than random weighted average (Stanley, 2008; Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). In every
case, total revenue and total spending are used as reference categories. For each column we
estimate Equation 3, by just adding the fiscal tools as covariates.
Few papers study the composition of fiscal manipulation at the national level, relative to stud-
ies at the municipality level. Regarding revenue, seminal contributions of Ashworth and Heyndels
(2002); Efthyvoulou (2012) and Katsimi and Sarantides (2012), focus on OECD countries, while
Block (2002) and Ehrhart (2013) study manipulation of revenue composition in developing coun-
tries. We split revenue into direct taxes (such as income taxes, payroll taxes, property taxes),
external taxes (international trade taxes), indirect taxes (value added tax (VAT), general sales
tax (GST)) and non-tax revenue (especially social security revenue, goods and services revenue,
government borrowing). The MRA results are unconclusive about the strategic use of specific
revenue categories by political leaders during electoral race. So, as recalled by Alesina et al.
(1989), political leaders may prefer avoiding tax reforms before election to maintain social order.
Regarding manipulation of spending composition, some articles contrast capital and current
spending (Block, 2002; Schuknecht, 2000; Block et al., 2003; Vergne, 2009; Efthyvoulou, 2012;
Katsimi and Sarantides, 2012; Combes et al., 2015, among others), while other papers distinguish
local public good spending from broad public good spending (Schuknecht, 2000; Persson and
Tabellini, 2003a; Chang, 2008; Potrafke, 2010; Enkelmann and Leibrecht, 2013; Klomp and
de Haan, 2013a, among others). We adopt a similar methodology, by distinguishing capital
spending from current spending and broad public goods from local public goods. The MRA
reports clear spending shifts towards current spending and away from capital spending. The
findings are in accordance with Katsimi and Sarantides (2012) for OECD countries and with
Vergne (2009) for developing countries. They also suggest that leaders reduce expenditures
when the short-run benefits are not strong enough and reallocate the amount thus “saved” to
expenditure categories that offer them a greater and immediate political pay-off.
Our results provide evidence of composition effects in line with Vergne (2009) for instance.
Leaders appear to relax the budget constraint in pre-electoral periods. As the result, the primary
balance deteriorates and we observe PbCs. But the elasticity of budget constraint has its limits.
One of these is that making PbCs too important or perceptible is likely to be punished by voters
(Brender and Drazen, 2007). A way of bypassing the budget constraint is then to manipulate
the composition of public spending. Thus leaders appear to manipulate both the level and
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composition - at least the expenditure side - of budget. They have faced with two strategies
they may use as complement or substitute according to their power extent over the policy-making
and the political reward they expect from each strategy.
Finally, the MRA results uncover preferences of manipulation of broad public good spending
in pre-electoral periods. Some broad public goods, such as welfare spending, have a large compo-
nent of current spending, while some local public goods are mainly constituted by infrastructure
spending.27 In addition, political leaders may prefer giving satisfaction to a whole sociological
voters’ category rather than geographically targeted voters, to ensure strong electoral basis be-
fore elections, since we consider broad public good spending as a “[...] type of expenditure that
benefits broad groups in the population and is difficult to target towards narrow geographic con-
stituencies.” (Persson and Tabellini, 2003a, p. 4). To summarize, national political leaders have
incentives to allocate the cost of investment in current spending and increase broad public good
spending before elections. It is not conflicting with findings in the literature on higher capital
spending and local public goods in pre-electoral period at the municipality level, where voters’
preferences are much more targetable (Khemani, 2004; Eslava, 2005, for the case of Indian states
and Colombian municipalities, respectively). Also, favoring targeted groups such as swing voters
may be less easily detectable in the data.
[insert Table 2 and Table 3]
8. The declining magnitude of PbCs
As revealed by Figure 6 studies have continuously reported PbCs of lesser magnitude over
1992−2014. One may wonder if this declining trend is due to a lesser manipulation from leaders
or researchers. In the first case, we may imagine that the development of democracy and political
institutions accompanied with a greater voters’ information and experience, have led to a lesser
ability and willingness of leaders to distort budget before elections. In the second case, we may
imagine that the adoption of better practices by researchers, supported by the development
of suitable econometric tools, stronger requirements and scrutiny in the publication process or
even benefiting form larger sample size datasets with time have led and/or allowed researchers
to estimate PbCs in a less biased fashion.
27The dichotomy is no longer relevant with other examples, such as public agriculture spending, constituted
either by capital and current spending and considered as broad public goods in most developing countries and
local public goods in developed countries (de Haan and Klomp, 2013; Klomp and de Haan, 2013a).
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In order to answer this question, we split our sample in four sub-samples. The first sub-
sample encompasses observations collected from papers released in 2000 or before. The second
sub-sample gathers studies form 2001 to 2005, the third one from 2006 to 2010 and the last one
from 2011 to our search limit that is January 1st 2015. We then run Equation 2 on each of these
four sub-samples.
The results presented in Table 4, suggest that both the magnitude of PbCs and research
bias have been declining. We remain cautious in our interpretation since column 1 shows no
publication selection bias for early studies and column 2 no occurrence of PbCs in studies re-
leased between 2001 and 2005. However the overall tendency over the four columns points to
enforce that the magnitude of research bias has declined by about one third since 2000, and the
magnitude of budget manipulation itself has been divided by a factor of four or five since the
pioneer empirical findings on PbCs.
[insert Table 4]
9. Country characteristics
In the literature, several authors argue that the existence of PbCs depends on country char-
acteristics. The MRA allows exploring which factors determine (or promote) the budget manip-
ulation by political leaders. To do so, we rely on the conditional factors censused by de Haan
and Klomp (2013), namely economic development, the quality and age of democracy, and con-
stitutional settings. More precisely, we augment the model given in Equation 2 by including a
dummy equaling one for estimates from regressions containing only observations for which the
conditional factor is present. For instance, the“Low-income countries”dummy takes the value of
one for estimates computed on the sample of low-income countries only. We present the results
in Table 5.28
Even if the evidence in the literature is mixed, conventional thinking is that PbCs are more
likely to occur or to be stronger in less developed economies (Shi and Svensson, 2006; Streb et al.,
2009). The first two columns of Table 5 show that this view is not supported by the meta-data.
28We consider methodologies from the World Bank, to capture economic development status, using the last year
of estimates for each regression, as reference, Brender and Drazen (2005) to capture the age and level of democracy,
but also Cheibub et al. (2010), Blume and Voigt (2011) and Bormann and Golder (2013) for constitutional rules,
when authors do not use their own classification rules. Results are robust to applying a common classification
methodology for all papers.
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The coefficients associated with the dummies bear the expected sign but are not statistically
significant. We do not detect any difference in the level of manipulation between low- and
high-income countries. Another debate in the literature concerns the effect of democracy on the
occurrence of PbCs. Some authors such as Gonzalez (2002) and Block et al. (2003) argue that
the strength of democracy is negatively correlated with budget manipulation, whereas others
(Brender and Drazen, 2005; Klomp and de Haan, 2013b) consider that it is rather the age of
democracy that matters most. Subsequently, we examine both the effect of the age and level of
democracy in columns 3 to 6. We see that the average effect of budget manipulation given by the
PET coefficient is actually mainly driven by the set of young democracies. Older democracies
exhibit significantly less strong effects. Actually the coefficient associated to the “Established
democracies” offsets the PET coefficient, suggesting that leaders facing experienced voters are
not likely to engage in pre-electoral budget distortions. On the other hand, it appears that
a high-level of democracy is associated with reduced PbCs. Even if the less distorting effects
are both statistically and economically more substantial in established democracies compared
to stronger democracies, we cannot clearly conclude which democracy characteristic dominates.
And the debate stays open. The quality and age of democracy often go together, that make their
respective effects difficult to disentangle. At this stage the most plausible interpretation is that
both matter. Even when voters are experienced, a degradation of the democracy level may offer
a leader a greater room for manipulation, and conversely.29 Additionally, we investigate how the
institutional settings result in a greater tendency of leaders to create pre-electoral budget cycles
(Persson and Tabellini, 2003b). The evidence on this question is rather limited and results point
in opposite direction (Streb et al., 2009; Klomp and de Haan, 2013b). In particular, we assess if
leaders have greater incentives to generate PbCs in parliamentary systems relative to presidential
ones, and in majoritary voting systems relative to proportional representation. Regarding the
form of government or the electoral rules, the last four columns of Table 5 show that on average
leaders do not behave differently regarding their level of budget manipulation according to the
constitutional design.30
29Additional descriptive statistics on PbCs magnitude, conditional on geographic regions and political regimes
are provided in supplementary appendix.
30A finer analysis of the manipulation of budget components (revenue vs expenditure for instance), as it had
been undertaken by Persson and Tabellini (2003a) might reveal different strategies according to the nature of
institutions whose the result is not detectable by just looking at the variation of the overall budget. However, due
to the lack of observations, we are not able to proceed to this narrower analysis at the meta-level.
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Finally, only the strength and the age democracy appear to significantly affect the level of
PbCs. In particular, younger and low-level democratic regimes are characterized by PbCs of
greater magnitude. The MRA additionally reveals that other factors discussed in the literature
do not systematically affect budget manipulation, so that cannot be qualified as a condition for
the existence of PbCs.
[insert Table 5]
10. Sources of heterogeneities
So far, our analysis has evidenced two main results. First we showed that PbCs do exist
but are fairly overstated by researchers. Second we further decompose overall budget in its sub-
components and assess how country characteristics may affect the occurrence of PbCs. We now
turn to an exhaustive analysis of other potential sources of heterogeneity in the estimates found
in the literature. To do so, we conduct a multiple MRA in two parts. The first part focuses on
the sample and the model specification whereas the second part deals with the characteristics
of the source paper, the methodology used and the choice of the covariates included in the
model.31 It is not an easy task to precisely identify each source of heterogeneity. However, we
believe that result searching and selection bias are even more likely to be captured by the second
part of the multiple MRA. That is, when seeking specific results, authors are likely to play on
leverages such as the choice of the econometric estimator or the list of covariates for instance.
As a consequence, we think the first part offers information about which factors may affect
the manipulation by leaders, whereas the second part reflects how researchers may manipulate
their results. Nonetheless, the border between the two kinds of manipulation is blurred. For each
source of heterogeneity we examine (i.e. each covariate of our multiple MRA), both explanations
are plausible and compatible. Then we do not pretend our classification allows disentangling
precisely the effect from each kind of manipulation. Consequently, we remain cautious in our
interpretation.
31Given that the choice of decomposing the multiple analysis in two parts may impose a structure on the data
and condition our results, we also conduct a bayesian MRA on the whole set of covariates. This investigation offers
comparable results with the two-part multiple MRA. Results and a brief discussion are provided in supplementary
appendix.
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10.1. Data and model specification
We run the multivariate MRA model described by Equation (3). This model allows observing
the causes of heterogeneous findings on PbCs in the empirical literature. In particular, this
section intends to improve our understanding on how determinants related to the sample and
model specification would condition the existence and magnitude of PbCs.
The first four columns of Tables 6 and 7 present the results for the whole sample using the
adjusted partial correlations. All the columns but column 2 report the general model with all
moderators, following the seminal meta-analysis literature in economics (Askarov and Doucou-
liagos, 2013; Costa-Font et al., 2014; de Linde Leonard et al., 2014, among others), estimated
with WLS weighted by precision and clustered by studies.
Column 3 controls for author fixed effects with the FEML estimator. As the number of
clusters relative to the number of MRA moderators is small (Askarov and Doucouliagos, 2013),
we use the FEML estimator by double clustering standard errors on studies and fiscal output, in
column 4.32 In contrast, column 2 employs the general-to-specific methodology, whereby MRA
explanatory variables which are not significant at the 10% level in column 1 are removed from
the estimation in order to have a parsimonious model (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). As the
FEML estimator is considered as the most exhaustive, it is our benchmark when interpreting
results.
Table 6 reveals a substantial selection bias that disappears when controlling for author fixed
effects. This encourages us to explore further sources of strategic manipulation by researchers.33
It is also worthy to note that the constant, reflecting the genuine effect of elections on budget
variations, is larger than the value found in the simple MRA. The coefficient is now above 0.10,
that is a medium effect according to Cohen (1988).
Additionally, we do not find strong effects of sample choice. Results simply suggest PbCs
are less severe with data covering the 1990s than with data encompassing earlier decades. The
difference is statistically significant and economically not negligible.34 As for spatial differences,
we only notice that Western countries and Japan are less affected by pre-electoral cycles. This
32Recall there are 24 distinct measures of fiscal outputs that are reported in the 57 studies included in our
analysis.
33See Section 10.2.
34It could reflect the implementation of theories on hysteresis of unemployment (Blanchard and Summers, 1986)
and time inconsistency (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983) to policies in the 1990s. The result
could also be driven by a couple of papers reporting weak evidence of budget manipulation, using data from the
1990s. Recall that covered decades refer to data, not publication timing (see Section 8).
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result is in line with the idea that in older and stronger democracies PbCs are less strong.
However, the evidence is not very robust.
We then investigate if the model specification affects the strength of PbCs. In particular
we focus on how selecting a subsample would matter. Interestingly, we notice that subsamples
on established democracies exhibit significantly reduced PbCs, and results are strongly robust
to the introduction of author dummies. In line with Table 3 and the seminal work of Brender
and Drazen (2005), we have suggesting evidence that informed and experienced voters signals
democratic maturity and reduce the extent of budget manipulation.
[insert Table 6]
10.2. Paper, methodology and covariates
The MRA reported in Table 7 incorporates several key variables related to publication itself,
the methodology and the list of covariates retained by authors to explain the heterogeneity of the
results. Once again, the publication bias disappears when augmenting the model with author
dummies. We then look if the characteristics of papers play a role. A first hypothesis we test is
about higher PbCs reported in published papers, relative to unpublished ones. Journals would
be more prone to select significant over zero-effect results. The coefficient associated with the
variable “Unpublished” suggests this is not the case. Second, the quality of the paper, proxied,
through the Google Scholar five-year impact factor of the review or series in which the paper is
published, does not affect the level of manipulation either. We also focus on a specific journal
for which political cycles are one of the main topics, namely the Public Choice journal. Despite
an editorial boarding focused on decision-makers’ strategic behavior, the journal does not seem
to publish disproportionately PbCs-friendly articles. Last but not least, we have suggesting
evidence of the decreasing trend of electoral manipulation in the PbCs literature, by taking into
account the timing of publication (see columns 3 and 4). As the “Before2008 ” coefficient is
significant when controlling for author fixed effects, it could imply a genuine decline in PbCs,
which may be hidden by scholars. In line with the structural break identified in Figure 6,
the timing of publication could also capture the enhancing effect of massive fiscal stimulus -in
response to the global recession of 2008− 2009 (Lee et al., 2009)-, on regression results.
A second block of covariates focuses on the methodology employed by authors. More pre-
cisely, we look at the measure of the election and fiscal output variables selected, and at the
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estimator selected. According to preliminary evidence, the magnitude of the electoral manipula-
tion differs when the dependent variable refers to fiscal surpluses, as underlined by the coefficient
on YSurplus (columns 1−4). This entails that PbCs magnitude is related to the nature of fiscal
output.35 Adjustments on fiscal output also matter. Indeed, strategic manipulation is found to
be significantly reinforced when using data from central governments, once taking into account
authors’ unobservable heterogeneity (columns 3 and 4). Adjustments on the electoral calendar,
elections for the executive and predetermined elections can be a serious issue in the PbCs lit-
erature. Among adjustments on elections, relying only on predetermined election, is associated
with less magnitude in PbCs. The econometric methodology makes a difference. Using dynamic
panel estimator leads to more severe PbCs (columns 1 and 2). One possible explanation is the
use and abuse of GMM estimators to find convincing results on PbCs. This findings finds sup-
port since the effect disappears once we control for author fixed effects. Conversely, correction
of standard errors for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation contributes to decreasing the mag-
nitude of PbCs (columns 1−4). That is, using more requiring estimators leads to smaller PbCs.
Finally, the last block of Table 7 shows that the choice of the vector of covariates is not neutral
and may affect the strength of PbCs reported by researchers. Hence, when determining the way
they measure their variables of interest, which control variables they include in their economet-
ric model and which methodology and estimator they use to estimate it, authors may increase
their expectancy to obtain specific and significant results in order to validate their ideology or
theoretical assumptions.36
[insert Table 7]
11. Conclusion
Initiated by Nordhaus (1975), the PbCs literature is still flourishing, as empirical findings
are not unanimous on the existence and magnitude of such cycles. A couple of narrative reviews
helps to understand how the literature is structured and what are the main conditions affecting
the strategic manipulation of budget by political leaders in pre-electoral period. We go one
step further by offering a statistical and systematic analysis of all PbCs-related academic papers
35See Section 3.
36As we find suggesting evidence of the damping impact of established democracies on PbCs, we select covariates
from Brender and Drazen (2005) as references, but also taking into account for the introduction, or not, of partisan
cycles.
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with the intention to identify the main sources of variability observed in the literature and obtain
robust and reliable statistical information on the genuine effects of elections on fiscal tools.
We conduct our analysis on the 1, 331 estimates of PbCs collected from 57 cross-country
studies. The MRA reveals a significant selection bias from scholars translating an inclination to
exaggerate the magnitude of PbCs. However, after controlling for this overestimation, we still
find a slight but statistically robust evidence of manipulation of budget by leaders. If neces-
sary, this confirms the opportunistic nature of leaders and the need to strengthen political and
economic institutions in order to increase accountability and edge toward the ideal of democracy.
Interestingly, we show that the deterioration of the primary balance before elections is sys-
tematic, but evidence of public revenue and spending manipulation is slightly less robust. We
attribute this findings to various strategies from leaders, using either spending or revenue, ac-
cording to the political costs-benefits trade-off they face. By disaggregating public spending,
we find that leaders are more prone to manipulating some subcomponents, such as increasing
current expenditures relative to capital spending, but also broad public goods, in pre-electoral
period. By contrast, incumbents do not systematically target specific subcomponents of revenue
when they adopt a tax cut strategy in order to maximize their reelection prospects.
In addition, concluding that bias from research in this literature is greater than the manip-
ulation of budget by leaders, we realize a sensitivity analysis assessing how model specifications
and methodological choices adopted by authors may affect PbCs estimates. Finally, the evidence
of strategic manipulation we observe on fiscal aggregate levels is very likely to be magnified by
composition manipulation (Rogoff, 1990; Ashworth and Heyndels, 2002; Brender and Drazen,
2013, as references). Once again, this impels scientists to further research on political cycles and
the way to limit them in order to make democracy more effective.
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Table 1: Estimates of the FAT-PET MRA [Basic results]
Regression/s.e.
(1) FAT (2) PET
Funnel asymmetry Meta-average N
(i) All observations (Adjusted Partial Correlation)
Double publication removed
Robust s.e. 0.775*** (0.083) 0.023*** (0.003) 1,331
Clustered s.e. 0.775*** (0.215) 0.023*** (0.006) 1,331
Double clustered s.e. 0.775*** (0.215) 0.023*** (0.007) 1,331
Robust regression 0.865*** (0.086) 0.024*** (0.003) 1,331
(ii) Excluding “pork-barrel” (Adjusted partial correlation)
Robust s.e. 0.889*** (0.086) 0.021*** (0.003) 913
Clustered s.e. 0.888*** (0.200) 0.021*** (0.005) 913
Double clustered s.e. 0.889*** (0.230) 0.021*** (0.008) 913
Robust regression 0.896*** (0.087) 0.023*** (0.003) 913
(iii) Excluding interactions (Adjusted partial correlation)
Robust s.e. 0.803*** (0.085) 0.022*** (0.003) 1,037
Clustered s.e. 0.803*** (0.163) 0.022*** (0.005) 1,037
Double clustered s.e. 0.803*** (0.205) 0.022*** (0.007) 1,037
Robust regression 0.917*** (0.090) 0.022*** (0.003) 1,037
(iv) Ecxluding subsample (Adjusted partial correlation)
Robust s.e. 0.638*** (0.154) 0.032*** (0.005) 583
Clustered s.e. 0.652 (0.449) 0.032** (0.013) 583
Double clustered s.e. 0.638* (0.347) 0.032*** (0.012) 583
Robust regression 0.728*** (0.159) 0.033*** (0.006) 583
Notes: Panel (i) reports all observations. Panel (ii) excludes subcomponents of revenue and spending. Panel (iii) excludes interactive models.
Panel (iv) excludes subsamples. The first four rows of each panels use the weighted least squares (WLS), with precision squared (inverse
variance) used as weights. Clustering on studies, or double clustering on studies and fiscal outputs. Cohen’s (1988) guidelines: small= less
than 0.10; medium> 0.30; large> 0.50. ∗p < 0.10,∗ ∗ p < 0.05,∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 2: Estimates of the FAT-PET MRA [By fiscal output]
Regression/s.e.
(1) FAT (2) PET
Funnel asymmetry Meta-average N
(i) Spending
Robust s.e. 0.776*** (0.133) 0.014*** (0.005) 535
Clustered s.e. 0.776* (0.401) 0.014 (0.011) 535
Double Clustered s.e. 0.776** (0.352) 0.014 (0.010) 535
Robust regression 0.793*** (0.166) 0.016** (0.006) 535
(ii) Restrictive measure of spending
Robust s.e. 0.651*** (0.159) 0.013** (0.005) 275
Clustered s.e. 0.651 (0.450) 0.013 (0.013) 275
Robust regression 0.578*** (0.180) 0.016** (0.007) 275
(iii) Revenue
Robust s.e. -0.617*** (0.178) -0.021*** (0.007) 354
Clustered s.e. -0.617* (0.347) -0.021 (0.015) 354
Double Clustered s.e. -0.617* (0.356) -0.021 (0.015) 354
Robust regression -0.692*** (0.157) -0.026*** (0.006) 354
(iv) Restrictive measure of revenue
Robust s.e. -0.883*** (0.166) -0.011 (0.007) 196
Clustered s.e. -0.883** (0.307) -0.011 (0.012) 196
Robust regression -0.792*** (0.121) -0.023*** (0.004) 196
(v) Fiscal surplus
Robust s.e. -1.065*** (0.119) -0.029*** (0.004) 442
Clustered s.e. -1.065*** (0.299) -0.029*** (0.007) 442
Robust regression -1.216*** (0.116) -0.025*** (0.004) 442
Notes: See Table 1. The dependent variable is the non-adjusted partial correlation between elections and fiscal output. Panel (i) reports
observations on spending. Panel (ii) excludes subcomponents of spending. Panel (iii) reports observations on revenue. Panel (iv) excludes
subcomponents of revenue. Panel (v) reports observations on fiscal surpluses. ∗p < 0.10,∗ ∗ p < 0.05,∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 3: MRA [Patterns of manipulation]
Variables Revenue Spending
WLS FEML WLS FEML
Direct Taxes -0.004 0.007 - -
External Taxes -0.006 -0.019 - -
Indirect Taxes -0.012 -0.003 - -
Non Tax Revenue 0.073 -0.040* - -
Current Spending - - 0.041*** 0.028***
Capital Spending - - -0.085*** -0.096***
Broad Public Good - - 0.042** 0.048***
Local Public Good - - 0.043*** 0.016
Missing Category Total revenue Total Spending
RMSE 0.048 0.039 0.049 0.038
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.649 0.335 0.733
Number of cluster 42 42 59 59
FAT/PET Yes Yes Yes Yes
Authors fixed effect No Yes No Yes
N 354 354 535 535
Notes: See Table 1. Dependent variable: non-adjusted partial correlation. All columns are estimated with WLS (precision squared weights)
and double clustered standard errors. Author’s dummies are included in fixed effects multi level (FEML)
estimator.∗p < 0.10,∗ ∗ p < 0.05,∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Figure 6: Average (adjusted) partial correlation of elections, per publication year
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Notes: We compute averaged partial correlation for each publication year using our sample of 57 studies. Detailed figures are provided in
Table A.11.
Table 4: MRA [Publication timing and PbCs]
Publication Publication Publication Publication
Variables pre 2000a 2001-2005 2005-2010 2011-2014
Standard error (FAT) -0.259 0.940* 0.628** 0.676*
(0.786) (0.499) (0.288) (0.352)
Constant (PET) 0.126*** 0.007 0.043*** 0.026***
(0.040) (0.021) (0.012) (0.010)
RMSE 0.045 0.046 0.061 0.051
Adjusted R2 -0.039 0.057 0.060 0.033
Number of cluster 17 30 26 75
N 26 185 267 853
Notes: See Table 1. Dependent variable: adjusted partial correlation. All columns are estimated with WLS (precision squared weights) and
double clustered standard errors.a: Despite the small number of observations, results are qualitatively unchanged when using White
correction instead of clustering.∗p < 0.10,∗ ∗ p < 0.05,∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Multiple FAT-PET models [Data and model specification]
Variables
All Observations
(Adjusted Partial Correlation)
General Specific FEML FEML
double cluster
Publication bias
Standard error
1.078*** 0.913*** 0.567 0.567*
(0.288) (0.216) (0.363) (0.336)
Model structure
Interactive model -0.000 0.012 0.012*
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
Subsample
-0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
ConstitSamp
-0.028* -0.017* -0.000 -0.000
(0.014) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004)
HighincSamp
-0.008 -0.007 -0.007
(0.020) (0.017) (0.014)
EstdemocSamp
-0.032*** -0.033*** -0.046*** -0.046***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012)
HighdemocSamp
-0.007 -0.011 -0.011
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008)
BadSamp 0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Time and region
1980s 0.015 0.013 0.013
(0.019) (0.026) (0.028)
1990s
-0.089*** -0.093*** -0.050 -0.050*
(0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.028)
Recent
0.005 0.013* 0.013
(0.008) (0.007) (0.011)
Eeca
0.019** 0.009** -0.010 -0.010
(0.008) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008)
Lac
0.007 0.004 0.004
(0.021) (0.016) (0.014)
Mena
0.004 -0.009 -0.009
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Sap
0.007 0.008 0.008
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
Ssa
-0.015 0.015 0.015
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
WeJ
0.008 -0.005 -0.005
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Global
-0.021 -0.014 -0.014
(0.015) (0.010) (0.010)
Constant 0.090* 0.112*** - -
(0.046) (0.032) - -
RMSE 0.050 0.050 0.045 0.045
Adjusted R2 0.138 0.128 0.616 0.616
Number of cluster 57 57 57 148
Number of covariates 19 6 18 18
Authors fixed effect No No Yes Yes
N 1,331 1,331 1,331 1,331
Notes: See Table 1. Estimation using WLS, with precision squared weights. Columns 3 and 4 include authors fixed effects (not reported).
Standard errors clustered by studies in parenthesis. Double clustering on studies and fiscal outputs in column 4. Adjusted R2 is not strictly
comparable across the different models. ∗p < 0.10,∗ ∗ p < 0.05,∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Multiple FAT-PET models [Paper, methodology and covariates]
Variables
All Observations
(Adjusted Partial Correlation)
General Specific FEML FEML
double cluster
Publication bias
Standard error
0.948*** 0.823*** 0.430 0.430
(0.209) (0.198) (0.334) (0.324)
Paper
Public Choice 0.012 -0.020 -0.020
(0.011) (0.015) (0.017)
Unpublished
0.012 -0.138 -0.138
(0.011) (0.092) (0.088)
Impact Factor
-0.000 0.002 0.002
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Before 2008 -0.008 -0.084*** -0.084***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.019)
Methodology
Samplesize 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Infrannual
-0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.010) (0.006) (0.024)
YSurplus
0.029*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
YVar
-0.014 0.001 0.001
(0.014) (0.011) (0.006)
YCycl
-0.031** -0.030*** -0.002 -0.002
(0.015) (0.006) (0.015) (0.018)
YCentral
0.001 0.057*** 0.057***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.016)
ElectDum
-0.012** -0.012** -0.004 -0.004
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
ElectRat
-0.025** -0.026** -0.008 -0.008
(0.011) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006)
Adjust. Calendar
0.002 -0.009 -0.009
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
Adjust. Highest
0.008 0.174 0.174
(0.009) (0.114) (0.111)
Adjust. Exog
-0.011 -0.012* -0.012*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
EconDynamic
0.015** 0.014** 0.006 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
SE Correction -0.010 -0.011*** -0.011***
(0.008) (0.003) (0.004)
Covariates
GDPpc. 0.007 -0.015 -0.015
(0.013) (0.017) (0.013)
Trade
-0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.020) (0.027) (0.020)
PopStruct
0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.019) (0.015) (0.012)
OG
-0.005 -0.023* -0.023**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011)
Partisan
0.042** 0.032** -0.016 -0.016
(0.018) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Time
0.011 0.007* 0.007
(0.007) (0.004) (0.005)
Constant 0.002 0.025** - -
(0.021) (0.010) - -
RMSE 0.049 0.050 0.045 0.045
Adjusted R2 0.167 0.136 0.621 0.621
Number of cluster 57 57 57 148
Number of covariates 25 7 24 24
Authors fixed effect No No Yes Yes
N 1,331 1,331 1,331 1,331
Notes: See Table 6.
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Appendix A. List of studies and descriptive statistics
Table A.8: List of studies
Author(s) Author(s) Author(s)
1 Afonso (2008) 21 Galeotti and Salford (2001) 41 Morozumi et al. (2014)b
2 Alesina et al. (1992) 22 Golinelli and Momigliano (2006) 42 Moura˜o (2011)
3 Alesina et al. (1993) 23 Hagen (2007) 43 Nieto-Parra and Santiso (2009)
4 Alesina et al. (2006) 24 Hallerberg et al. (2002) 44 Nyblade and O’Mahony (2014)
5 Alt and Lassen (2006) 25 Hanusch (2012) 45 Persson and Tabellini (2003a)
6 Ashworth and Heyndels (2002) 26 Hanusch and Vaaler (2013) 46 Potrafke (2007)
7 Barberia and Avelino (2011) 27 Hanusch and Keefer (2014) 47 Potrafke (2010)
8 Bayar and Smeets (2009) 28 Jong-A-Pin et al. (2012) 48 Schuknecht (1996)
9 Block (2002) 29 Kaplan and Thomsson (2014) 49 Schuknecht (2000)
10 Block et al. (2003) 30 Katsimi and Sarantides (2012) 50 Shelton (2014)
11 Bove et al. (2014) 31 Klasˇnja (2008) 51 Shi and Svensson (2006)
12 Brender and Drazen (2005) 32 Klomp and de Haan (2013a) 52 Stanova (2009)
13 Buti and Van Den Noord (2004) 33 Klomp and de Haan (2013b) 53 Streb et al. (2009)
14 Combes et al. (2015)a 34 Klomp and de Haan (2013c) 54 Streb et al. (2012)
15 Costa-Fernandes and Mota (2013) 35 Klomp and de Haan (2013d) 55 Troeger and Schneider (2012)
16 Dreher and Vaubel (2004) 36 Kouvavas (2013) 56 Tujula and Wolswijk (2007)
17 Ebeke and O¨lc¸er (2013) 37 Kraemer (1997) 57 Wright (2011)
18 Efthyvoulou (2012) 38 Maurel (2006)
19 Ehrhart (2013) 39 Mink and de Haan (2006)
20 Franzese (2000) 40 Mosley and Chiripanhura (2012)
Notes: a: As the publication date is after december 31th 2014, we take into account the working paper version (Combes et al., 2013). b: We
do not consider regressions from Table 2 to Table 5 in Morozumi et al. (2014) due to lack of information on effective reference category for
elections.
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Table A.9: Summary of studies
Paper Sample Time period Estimator Fiscal outputa Election Mean (adjust) partial Median (adjust) partial No. of estimates
1 Afonso (2008) 15 European Union countries 1970-2003b OLS pooling & Fixed effects Fiscal sold Binary variable -0.11 -0.09 15
2 Alesina and Roubini (1992) 18 OECD countries 1960-1987 Fixed effects Fiscal sold Binary variable 0.13 0.13 3
3 Alesina et al. (1993) 14 OECD countries 1960-1987 Fixed effects Fiscal sold Binary variable 0.11 0.12 8
4 Alesina et al. (2006) Developed and developing countries 1960-2003 Fixed effects Fiscal sold Binary variable 0.03 0.03 3
5 Alt and Lassen (2006) 19 OECD countriesb 1989-1998 AB GMM Fiscal sold Binary variable 0.15 0.15 7
6 Ashworth and Heyndels (2002) 18 OECD countries 1965-1995 Fixed effects & Random effects Direct taxes & Nonfiscal revenue Binary variable 0.03 0.04 12
7 Barberia and Avelino (2011) 18 Latin America countries 1973-2008 OLS pooling & Fixed effects & AB GMM & System GMM Fiscal sold & Total spending & Total revenue Binary variable 0.04 0.05 120
8 Bayar and Smeets (2009) 15 European Union countries 1971-2006 Fixed effects Fiscal sold Binary variable 0.08 0.13 3
9 Block (2002) 44 SSA countries 1980-1995 OLS pooling & Fixed effects & AB GMM & System GMM Fiscal sold & Total spending & Current spending & Nonfiscal revenue Binary variable 0.07 0.09 12
10 Block et al. (2003) 44 SSA countriesb 1980-1995 OLS pooling & Fixed effects & AB GMM Current spending Binary variable 0.01 -0.01 3
11 Bove et al. (2014) 22 OECD countriesb 1981-2009b Random effects & Panel corrected SE & LSDV Broad public goods & Local public goods Binary variable 0.12 0.12 19
12 Brender (2003) 80 Developed and developing countriesb 1960-2001b Fixed effects Fiscal sold & Total spending & Total revenue Binary variable 0.04 0.05 87
13 Brender and Drazen (2005) 68 Developed and developing countriesb 1960-2001 Fixed effects Fiscal sold & Total spending & Total revenue Binary variable 0.06 0.04 45
14 Buti and Van Den Noord (2004) 11 European & Monetary Union countries 1999-2002 OLS pooling Fiscal sold & Total spending & Total revenue Binary variable -0.09 0.04 5
15 Combes et al. (2015)c 70 Developing countriesb 1990-2010 AB GMM & System GMM Current spending & Capital spending Binary variable 0.07 0.06 10
16 Costa-Fernandes and Mota (2013) 12 European Union countries 1976-2008 AB GMM & System GMM Fiscal sold & Total spending & Total taxes & Broad public goods Franzese’s full ratio 0.00 0.01 16
17 Dreher and Vaubel (2004) 77 Developed and developing countriesb 1975-1997 OLS pooling & 2SLS estimator & System GMM Fiscal sold Other 0.07 0.06 3
18 Ebeke and O¨lc¸er (2013) 61 Developing countriesb 1990-2010 OLS pooling & 2SLS estimator & System GMM Fiscal sold & Current spending & Capital spending & Direct taxes & Indirect taxes & External taxes Binary variable 0.01 0.01 16
19 Efthyvoulou (2012) 27 European Union countriesb 1997-2008b Fixed effects & System GMM Fiscal sold & Total spending & Total revenue & Current spending & Capital spending & Current revenue & Total taxes Binary variable 0.21 0.21 35
20 Ehrhart (2013) 56 Developing countriesb 1980-2006 Fixed effects & System GMM Direct taxes & Indirect taxes Binary variable 0.03 0.04 28
21 Franzese (2000) 21 OECD countries 1956-1990 Panel corrected SE Fiscal sold Other 0.12 0.12 1
22 Galeotti and Salford (2001) 18 OECD countries 1961-1995b GLS estimator Fiscal sold & Total spending & Total taxes Binary variable 0.09 0.08 4
23 Golinelli and Momigliano (2006) 11 European Union countries 1988-2006 GUM estimator Fiscal sold Binary variable 0.23 0.23 1
24 Hagen (2007) 24 OECD countries 1989-2005 System GMM Fiscal sold Binary variable 0.13 0.13 5
25 Hallerberg et al. (2002) 10 EU accession countries 1990-1999 OLS pooling Fiscal sold Franzese’s full ratio 0.20 0.20 2
26 Hanusch (2012) 28 Developed countriesb 1980-2008 OLS pooling & Fixed effects & System GMM Fiscal sold Binary variable 0.08 0.09 18
27 Hanusch and Vaaler (2013) 18 Emerging countriesb 1989-2004 Fixed effects & System GMM Fiscal sold Binary variable 0.17 0.17 8
28 Hanusch and Keefer (2014) 67 Developed and developing countriesb 1975-2008 Fixed effects & AB GMM & System GMM Total spending & Current spending Binary variable 0.06 0.06 26
29 Jong-A-Pin et al. (2012) 25 OECD countries 1996-2011 Fixed effects & SUR estimates Fiscal sold & Current spending & Capital spending & Current revenue Binary variable 0.00 -0.02 27
30 Kaplan and Thomsson (2014) 16 Latin America countries 1961-2011 Fixed effects & AB GMM Fiscal sold Binary variable 0.22 0.23 7
31 Katsimi and Sarantides (2012) 19 OECD countries 1972-2008b Fixed effects & AB GMM Fiscal sold & Total spending & Total revenue & Current spending & Capital spending & Direct taxes & Indirect taxes Binary variable & Other 0.03 0.02 73
32 Klasˇnja (2008) 25 EECA countriesb 1990-2006 Fixed effects Fiscal sold & Total spending & Total revenue & Broad public goods & Local public goods Binary variable 0.13 0.15 5
33 Klomp and de Haan (2013a) 70 Developed and developing countriesb 1970-2007b PMG & MG & DFE estimator Fiscal sold & Total spending Franzese’s full ratio 0.04 0.05 38
34 Klomp and de Haan (2013b) 65 Developed and developing countries 1975-2005 Semi-pooled model Fiscal sold & Total spending Franzese’s full ratio 0.04 0.04 2
35 Klomp and de Haan (2013c) 65 Developed and developing countriesb 1975-2005 (IV) Fixed effects Fiscal sold & Total spending Franzese’s full ratio 0.08 0.06 14
36 Klomp and de Haan (2013d) 67 Developed and developing countriesb 1975-2005 System GMM Broad public goods & Local public goods Binary variable & Franzese’s full ratio 0.09 0.08 13
37 Kouvavas (2013) 63 Developed and developing countriesb 1960-2001 Fixed effects & ABO GMM Fiscal sold Binary variable 0.07 0.06 15
38 Kraemer (1997) 20 Latin America countries 1983-1996 Fixed effects & ABO GMM Fiscal sold & Total spending & Total revenue & Current spending & Capital spending Other 0.09 0.09 5
39 Maurel (2006) 26 European countries 1990-2005b Fixed effects & ABO GMM Fiscal sold & Total spending & Total revenue Binary variable 0.03 0.04 12
40 Mosley and Chiripanhura (2012) 21 SSA countriesb 1980-2008 OLS pooling & Fixed effects & ABO GMM Fiscal sold Binary variable 0.10 0.08 5
41 Morozumi et al. (2014) 107 Developed and developing countriesb 1975-2010 OLS pooling & Fixed effects & ABO GMM Fiscal sold & Total spending & Total revenue & Current spending Binary variable & Franzese’s full ratio 0.05 0.07 232
& Capital spending & Direct taxes & Indirect taxes & External taxes
42 Moura˜o (2011) 60 Developed and developing countriesb 1960-2006 AB GMM Fiscal sold & Total spending & Total revenue Binary variable 0.02 0.02 30
43 Nieto-Parra and Santiso (2009) 46 OECD & Latin America countriesb 1990-2006 Fixed effects & AB GMM Fiscal sold & Total spending & Current spending & Capital spending Binary variable 0.09 0.08 48
44 Nyblade and O’Mahony (2014) 97 Developing countries 1975-2005 Fixed effects Fiscal sold Binary variable 0.06 0.06 1
45 Persson and Tabellini (2003a) 60 Developed and developing countriesb 1960-1998 Fixed effects Fiscal sold & Total spending & Total revenue & Broad public goods Binary variable 0.03 0.03 12
46 Potrafke (2007) 20 OECD countries 1980-2003 OLS pooling & Panel corrected SE & LSDV Broad public goods Other 0.03 0.03 6
47 Potrafke (2010) 18 OECD countries 1971-2004 Random effects & LSDV Broad public goods Other 0.09 0.09 24
48 Schuknecht (1996) 35 Developing countriesb 1970-1992 OLS pooling Fiscal sold Other 0.15 0.15 3
49 Schuknecht (2000) 24 Developing countries 1973-1992 Fixed effects Fiscal sold & Total spending & Total revenue & Current spending & Capital spending & Local public goods Other 0.10 0.09 6
50 Shelton (2014) 108 Developed and developing countriesb 1980-2007 Fixed effects & AB GMM Fiscal sold Binary variable 0.10 0.10 16
51 Shi and Svensson (2006) 85 Developed and developing countriesb 1975-1995 Fixed effects & System GMM Fiscal sold Binary variable 0.07 0.08 24
52 Stanova (2009) 10 NMS countriesb 1998-2008b OLS pooling Fiscal sold & Total spending & Total revenue Binary variable 0.15 0.14 102
53 Streb et al. (2009) 67 Developed and developing countriesb 1960-2001 OLS pooling & Fixed effects Fiscal sold & Total spending & Total revenue Binary variable & Other 0.09 0.10 6
54 Streb et al. (2012) 30 OECD & Latin America countriesb 1980-2005 Fixed effects Fiscal sold & Total spending & Total revenue Binary variable & Other 0.04 0.04 72
55 Troeger and Schneider (2012) 17 OECD countries 1975-2009 FEVD estimator Total spending & Direct taxes & Indirect taxes Binary variable 0.03 0.03 4
56 Tujula and Wolswijk (2007) 22 OECD countriesb 1970-2002 Fixed effects Fiscal sold Binary variable 0.11 0.11 6
57 Wright (2011) 116 Dictatorshipsb 1961-2006 Fixed effects Total expenditure Binary variable 0.04 0.03 8
Total 0.07 0.06 1331
Notes: a: Fiscal sold refers to fiscal surplus or fiscal deficit. b: Subsamples among countries and/or time period, within considered studies.c:
As the publication date is after december 31th 2014, we take into account the working paper version (Combes et al., 2013).
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Appendix B. Variable definitions
Table B.12: Variable definitions
No. Variables Variable Description (BD for binary dummy) N Mean Median S.D. Min Max
1 Adjustedpartial Partial correlation (adjusted for revenue and fiscal surplus). 1,331 0.07 0.06 0.09 -0.29 0.65
2 Partial Partial correlation (non adjusted for revenue and fiscal surplus). 1,331 -0.02 -0.04 0.11 -0.65 0.63
3 SE Standard error of the correlation. 1,331 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.26
Group 1 : Measures of cycle
4 YSur BD if used fiscal surplus (or inverse of deficit) over GDP. 1,726 0.35 0 0.48 0 1
5 YSpen BD if used total expenditure over GDP. 1,726 0.19 0 0.39 0 1
6 YRev BD if used total revenue over GDP. 1,726 0.14 0 0.35 0 1
7 YSpen bis BD if used total (or subcomponents) expenditure over GDP, in level, or per capita. 1,726 0.40 0 0.49 0 1
8 YRev bis BD if used total (or subcomponents) revenue over GDP. 1,726 0.25 0 0.44 0 1
9 YVar BD if dependent variable is in first difference or growth rate. 1,726 0.13 0 0.34 0 1
10 YCycla BD if dependent variable is cyclically adjusted. 1,726 0.06 0 0.23 0 1
11 YCentral BD if dependent variable explicitely refers to central government. 1,726 0.58 1 0.49 0 1
Group 2: Measure of electionsb
12 ElectDum BD if elections are captured by electoral dummies. 1,726 0.79 1 0.40 0 1
13 ElectRat BD if elections are captured by ratio a la Franzese. 1,726 0.19 0 0.39 0 1
14 ElectOth BD if elections are captured by other methods (used as the base). 1,726 0.04 0 0.19 0 1
Group 3: Adjustment on elections
15 ACalendar BD if adjustment for electoral or fiscal calendar. 1,726 0.18 0 0.39 0 1
16 AHighest BD if adjustment on election for the executive. 1,726 0.59 1 0.49 0 1
17 AExog BD if adjustment on predetermined election. 1,726 0.33 0 0.47 0 1
Group 4: Other methodologies
18 Samplesize Number of observations included in the sample. 1,726 719.20 466 779.59 15 6,631
19 Infra BD if infra annual data used. 1,726 0.05 0 0.22 0 1
20 EconDynamic BD if used dynamic panel estimator. 1,726 0.33 0 0.47 0 1
21 EconOther BD if used other estimator (used as the base). 1,726 0.67 1 0.47 0 1
22 SE correction BD if used SE correction for heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation. 1,726 0.50 0 0.50 0 1
Group 5: Model structure
23 Interactive BD if author(s) use interactive models. 1,726 0.38 0 0.48 0 1
24 Subsample BD if author(s) use subsample technique. 1,726 0.48 0 0.50 0 1
25 ConstitSamp BD if subsample on specific constitutional forms. 1,726 0.26 0 0.44 0 1
26 HighincSamp BD if subsample on high-income countries. 1,726 0.24 0 0.43 0 1
27 EstdemocSamp BD if subsample on established democracies. 1,726 0.16 0 0.37 0 1
28 HighdemocSamp BD if subsample on high level democracies. 1,726 0.02 0 0.16 0 1
29 BadSamp BD if subsample on other bad-case senarii for PbCs. 1,726 0.05 0 0.22 0 1
Group 6: Decades
30 Elder BD if data for the 50’s, 60’s or 70’s (used as the base). 1,726 0.63 1 0.48 0 1
31 1980s BD if data for the 80’s. 1,726 0.79 1 0.41 0 1
32 1990s BD if data for the 90’s. 1,726 0.97 1 0.18 0 1
33 Recent BD if data for the 00’s and 10’s. 1,726 0.86 1 0.35 0 1
Group 7: Region
34 WeJ BD if Western Europe, neo Europes & (or) Japan were included in samples. 1,726 0.73 1 0.44 0 1
35 Eeca BD if countries from Eastern Europe & Central Asia were included in samples. 1,726 0.55 1 0.50 0 1
36 Lac BD if countries from Latin America & Caribbean were included in samples. 1,726 0.62 1 0.49 0 1
37 Mena BD if countries from Middle-east & North Africa were included in samples. 1,726 0.49 0 0.50 0 1
38 Sap BD if countries from South Asia & Pacific were included in samples (except Japan). 1,726 0.51 1 0.50 0 1
39 Ssa BD if countries from Sub-saharan Africa were included in samples. 1,726 0.49 0 0.50 0 1
40 Global BD if at least two regions were included in samples. 1,726 0.62 1 0.48 0 1
Group 8: Publications outlet
41 Public Choice BD for Public Choice review. 1,726 0.11 0 0.32 0 1
42 Unpublished BD for unpublished paper. 1,726 0.49 0 0.50 0 1
43 Impact Factor 2015 Google Scholar five years index of journal. 1,726 25.92 15 27.21 0 168
44 Before2008 BD if paper is released ≤ 2008. 1,726 0.28 0 0.45 0 1
45 After2008 BD if paper is released > 2008 (used as the base). 1,726 0.72 1 0.45 0 1
Group 9: Covariates
46 GDPpc. BD for per capita GDP as control. 1,726 0.76 1 0.43 0 1
47 Trade BD for trade as control. 1,726 0.57 1 0.50 0 1
48 PopStruct BD for population structure as control. 1,726 0.61 1 0.49 0 1
49 OG BD for output gap as control. 1,726 0.51 1 0.50 0 1
50 Partisan BD for partisan measure (such as political ideology) as control. 1,726 0.13 0 0.33 0 1
51 Time BD for time dummies or time trend as control. 1,726 0.56 1 0.50 0 1
Notes: We keep 2 digits after comma, for convenience. a: We include the discretionary measures of Buti and Van Den Noord (2004) in this
category.b: Authors can use several measures of elections in the same regression.
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Appendix C. Bayesian meta-analysis [Supplementary material]
The bayesian analysis presents two advantages. First, it offers another rigorous and agnostic
approach to determine which factors affect the heterogeneity of the results found in the literature
and quantify these effects. Second, as we realize the multiple MRA in two stages, we believe
putting together all the covariates examined in sections 10.1 and 10.2 allow reassessing the effect
of each covariate without imposing any predetermined structure to our model of estimation.
We follow Havra´nek (2015) -in which the interesting reader can find more detailed technical
developments- and consider the uniform prior on model probabilities together with a UIP g-
prior.37 All results are display in Figure C.7 and Table C.13. We retain all covariates with a
posterior inclusion probability (PIP) over 50%, in the frequentist check OLS. We do not intend
to discuss results in details but we note in particular that the bayesian analysis confirms the
magnitude of publication bias relative to genuine effect. In addition we have further evidence
regarding heterogeneities accross time and space, but also the non-neutrality of the empirical
methodology employed to estimate PbCs and that maturity of democracy significantly reduces
their extent and constraints electorally-driven leaders’ manipulation of budget. These results
are robust to the use of alternative priors (see Figure C.8 and Table C.14) and to the use of
weighted estimates (see Figure C.9 and Table C.15).
37We use the BMS package of Stefan Zeugner. We consider a chain of 200 million recorded draws with 100
million burn-ins, by applying the birth-death sampler. 43, 818, 545 models are visited and the best 5, 000 models
have a cumulative probability of 69%. Additional details are available upon request.
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Table C.13: BMA [UIP g-prior; uniform model prior]
BMA Frequentist check (OLS)
Model prior: uniform Cluster: study Double cluster
PIP Post.mean Post.s.d. Cond.pos.sign Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
Publication bias
SE 1.000 0.905 0.113 1.000 0.804*** (0.183) 0.804*** (0.188)
Model structure
Interactive model 0.017 0.000 0.001 0.070
Subsample 0.022 0.000 0.001 0.915
ConstitSamp 1.000 -0.033 0.008 0.000 -0.014 (0.011) -0.014 (0.012)
HighincSamp 0.100 -0.001 0.005 0.000
EstdemocSamp 1.000 -0.042 0.009 0.000 -0.030*** (0.006) -0.030*** (0.011)
HighdemocSamp 0.012 0.000 0.002 0.483
BadSamp 0.036 -0.001 0.003 0.000
Time and Regions
1980s 0.025 0.000 0.002 0.930
1990s 0.992 -0.052 0.014 0.000 -0.073*** (0.022) -0.073*** (0.019)
Recent 0.034 0.000 0.002 0.884
Eeca 0.891 0.021 0.010 1.000 0.016** (0.006) 0.016* (0.008)
Lac 0.035 0.000 0.002 0.968
Mena 0.021 0.000 0.002 0.095
Sap 0.013 0.000 0.001 0.612
Ssa 0.048 -0.001 0.004 0.014
WeJ 0.036 0.000 0.002 0.003
Global 0.999 -0.042 0.009 0.000 -0.017** (0.007) -0.017* (0.009)
Paper
Public Choice 0.677 0.015 0.012 1.000 0.013* (0.007) 0.013 (0.015)
Unpublished 0.075 0.001 0.004 0.964
Impact factor 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.993
Before 2008 0.487 -0.010 0.011 0.000
Methodology
Samplesize 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.019
Infrannual 0.051 -0.001 0.004 0.003
YSurplus 1.000 0.034 0.005 1.000 0.025*** (0.004) 0.025*** (0.006)
YVar 0.999 -0.039 0.008 0.000 -0.009 (0.013) -0.009 (0.014)
YCycl 1.000 -0.053 0.012 0.000 -0.018* (0.010) -0.018 (0.014)
YCentral 0.193 0.003 0.006 1.000
ElectDum 0.054 0.000 0.003 0.800
ElectRat 0.601 -0.012 0.011 0.000 -0.010 (0.008) -0.010 (0.009)
ACalendar 0.012 0.000 0.001 0.634
AHighest 0.957 0.022 0.008 1.000 0.017** (0.007) 0.017** (0.008)
AExog 0.026 0.000 0.002 0.094
EconDynamic 0.603 0.009 0.009 1.000 0.009* (0.005) 0.009* (0.005)
Se Correction 0.691 -0.012 0.009 0.000 -0.006 (0.007) -0.006 (0.006)
Covariates
GDPpc. 0.060 0.001 0.004 0.999
Trade 0.069 -0.001 0.004 0.001
PopStruct 0.031 0.000 0.003 0.896
OG 0.019 0.000 0.001 0.856
Partisan 1.000 0.042 0.011 1.000 0.029** (0.012) 0.029** (0.011)
Time 0.453 0.007 0.009 1.000
Constant 1.000 0.076 NA NA 0.084*** (0.025) 0.084*** (0.024)
RMSE - 0.048 0.048
Adjusted R2 - 0.205 0.205
Number of studies 57 57 57
Number of cluster - 57 148
N 1,331 1,331 1,331
Notes: Dependent variable: adjusted partial correlation. Birth-death sampler used. Post.mean: posterior mean conditional on inclusion.
Post.s.d.: posterior standard deviation conditional on inclusion. Cond.pos.sign: probability of positive sign conditional on inclusion. In the
Frequentist check we only include explanatory variables with PIP > 0.500. The standard errors in the Frequentist check are clustered on
studies, or double clustered on studies and fiscal output.
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Table C.14: BMA [BRIC g-prior; beta-binomial model prior]
BMA Frequentist check (OLS)
Model prior: beta-binomial Cluster: study Double cluster
PIP Post.mean Post.s.d. Cond.pos.sign Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
Publication bias
SE 1.000 0.909 0.116 1.000 0.851*** (0.188) 0.851*** (0.190)
Model structure
Interactive model 0.009 0.000 0.001 0.229
Subsample 0.014 0.000 0.001 0.931
ConstitSamp 0.999 -0.033 0.007 0.000 -0.015 (0.010) -0.015 (0.012)
HighincSamp 0.051 -0.001 0.003 0.000
EstdemocSamp 1.000 -0.043 0.008 0.000 -0.031*** (0.006) -0.031*** (0.012)
HighdemocSamp 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.419
BadSamp 0.023 0.000 0.003 0.000
Time and Regions
1980s 0.012 0.000 0.001 0.891
1990s 0.985 -0.054 0.015 0.000 -0.077*** (0.023) -0.077*** (0.020)
Recent 0.024 0.000 0.002 0.928
Eeca 0.847 0.020 0.011 1.000 0.019*** (0.005) 0.019** (0.008)
Lac 0.020 0.000 0.002 0.981
Mena 0.010 0.000 0.001 0.188
Sap 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.645
Ssa 0.016 0.000 0.002 0.041
WeJ 0.019 0.000 0.002 0.001
Global 0.995 -0.040 0.010 0.000 -0.016** (0.007) -0.016* (0.009)
Paper
Public Choice 0.511 0.011 0.012 1.000 0.013 (0.008) 0.013 (0.016)
Unpublished 0.055 0.001 0.004 0.979
Impact factor 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.975
Before 2008 0.335 -0.006 0.010 0.000
Methodology
Samplesize 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.012
Infrannual 0.046 -0.001 0.005 0.000
YSurplus 1.000 0.033 0.005 1.000 0.025*** (0.004) 0.025*** (0.006)
YVar 0.998 -0.039 0.008 0.000 -0.011 (0.013) -0.011 (0.014)
YCycl 0.994 -0.050 0.012 0.000 -0.010 (0.009) -0.010 (0.013)
YCentral 0.113 0.002 0.005 1.000
ElectDum 0.043 0.000 0.003 0.926
ElectRat 0.344 -0.006 0.010 0.000
ACalendar 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.677
AHighest 0.962 0.024 0.008 1.000 0.016** (0.007) 0.016* (0.008)
AExog 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.115
EconDynamic 0.330 0.005 0.008 1.000
Se Correction 0.335 -0.005 0.008 0.000
Covariates
GDPpc. 0.042 0.001 0.003 1.000
Trade 0.029 0.000 0.003 0.000
PopStruct 0.021 0.000 0.003 0.954
OG 0.012 0.000 0.001 0.911
Partisan 0.999 0.040 0.010 1.000 0.024* (0.013) 0.024** (0.012)
Time 0.263 0.004 0.007 1.000
Constant 1.000 0.075 NA NA 0.084*** (0.024) 0.084*** (0.025)
RMSE - 0.048 0.048
Adjusted R2 - 0.198 0.198
Number of studies 57 57 57
Number of cluster - 57 148
N 1,331 1,331 1,331
Notes: See Table C.13.
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Table C.15: Weighted BMA [UIP g-prior; uniform model prior]
BMA Frequentist check (OLS)
Model prior: uniform Cluster: study Double cluster
PIP Post.mean Post.s.d. Cond.pos.sign Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
Publication bias
SE 1.000 1.549 0.106 1.000 1.073*** (0.245) 1.073*** (0.223)
Model structure
Interactive model 0.420 -0.005 0.007 0.000
Subsample 0.093 0.001 0.004 1.000
ConstitSamp 0.643 -0.015 0.013 0.000 -0.024* (0.013) -0.024* (0.012)
HighincSamp 0.783 -0.024 0.015 0.000 -0.010 (0.006) -0.010 (0.007)
EstdemocSamp 0.999 -0.032 0.008 0.000 -0.037*** (0.009) -0.037*** (0.013)
HighdemocSamp 0.039 -0.001 0.006 0.000
BadSamp 1.000 -0.051 0.010 0.000 0.003 (0.012) 0.003 (0.011)
Time and Regions
1980s 1.000 0.085 0.011 1.000 0.007 (0.017) 0.007 (0.016)
1990s 1.000 -0.050 0.011 0.000 -0.090*** (0.027) -0.090*** (0.023)
Recent 0.031 0.000 0.002 0.815
Eeca 1.000 0.052 0.008 1.000 0.015* (0.008) 0.015 (0.012)
Lac 0.168 0.004 0.010 0.978
Mena 0.028 0.000 0.002 0.070
Sap 0.033 0.000 0.003 0.060
Ssa 1.000 -0.070 0.010 0.000 -0.001 (0.012) -0.001 (0.014)
WeJ 0.659 -0.014 0.012 0.000 0.009 (0.009) 0.009 (0.011)
Global 0.505 -0.015 0.017 0.000 -0.023** (0.010) -0.023** (0.011)
Paper
Public Choice 0.012 0.000 0.001 0.698
Unpublished 0.923 0.020 0.008 1.000 0.002 (0.007) 0.002 (0.010)
Impact factor 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.014
Before 2008 0.107 -0.001 0.004 0.008
Methodology
Samplesize 0.143 0.000 0.000 0.000
Infrannual 0.033 0.000 0.003 0.001
YSurplus 1.000 0.030 0.005 1.000 0.025*** (0.004) 0.025*** (0.006)
YVar 0.525 -0.011 0.012 0.000 -0.000 (0.011) -0.000 (0.013)
YCycl 0.060 0.001 0.005 1.000
YCentral 0.016 0.000 0.001 0.733
ElectDum 0.045 0.000 0.003 0.133
ElectRat 0.894 -0.020 0.010 0.000 0.003 (0.011) 0.003 (0.009)
ACalendar 0.066 0.001 0.003 0.997
AHighest 1.000 0.032 0.006 1.000 0.009 (0.008) 0.009 (0.007)
AExog 1.000 0.042 0.007 1.000 -0.001 (0.008) -0.001 (0.009)
EconDynamic 0.863 0.014 0.007 1.000 0.008 (0.006) 0.008 (0.005)
Se Correction 0.031 0.000 0.001 0.000
Covariates
GDPpc. 0.957 0.028 0.009 1.000 0.012 (0.009) 0.012 (0.010)
Trade 0.112 -0.002 0.005 0.000
PopStruct 0.060 0.001 0.006 0.935
OG 0.027 0.000 0.002 0.967
Partisan 0.076 0.001 0.004 0.989
Time 0.735 0.011 0.008 1.000 0.005 (0.006) 0.005 (0.007)
Constant 1.000 1.004 NA NA 0.078** (0.035) 0.078** (0.031)
RMSE - 0.048 0.048
Adjusted R2 - 0.188 0.188
Number of studies 57 57 57
Number of cluster - 57 148
N 1,331 1,331 1,331
Notes: Inverse number of estimates weights. See Table C.13.
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Appendix D. Mapping PbCs [Supplementary material]
Table D.16: Geopolitics of PbCs
Geography of PbCs No. of estimates Mean (adjust) partial Median (adjust) partial Lower bound Upper bound
WeJ 221 0.046 0.051 -0.260 0.319
Eeca 112 0.146 0.140 -0.291 0.652
Lac 166 0.059 0.063 -0.094 0.291
Ssa 20 0.067 0.077 -0.213 0.386
Low-level democracies 45 0.040 0.044 -0.071 0.211
High-level democracies 26 0.060 0.034 -0.167 0.330
Including authoritarian states 261 0.065 0.070 -0.213 0.386
(all regressions including authoritarian obs.)
Young democracies 160 0.091 0.080 -0.167 0.652
Established democracies 231 0.035 0.038 -0.260 0.411
Notes: We focus on the following geographic regions: Western Europe & Japan (WeJ), Eastern Europe & Central Asia, Latin America &
Caribbean (Lac), and Sub-saharan Africa (Ssa). Not any one of the 57 studies focus exclusively on other regions. Descriptive statistics
regarding age and level of democracy also include countries from other regions.
Figure D.10: PbCs accross the world
Legend:
WeJ: 0.051
Lac: 0.063
Ssa: 0.077
Eeca: 0.140
Not under consideration
 
Scale 1:110,000,000.
Notes: We compute averaged partial correlation for each geographic region defined in Table D.16. This repartition of PbCs is not relevant in
failed states, due to the absence of state apparatus, or in countries without electoral races. For more details, see the Center for Systemic
Peace website, the Fund for Peace website, V-Dem website, Cheibub et al. (2010), and Boix et al. (2013), among others.
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Figure D.11: Established democracies at the January 1st, 2015
Legend:
Other countries
Established democracies
 
Scale 1:110,000,000.
Notes: Age of democracy, regarding methodology of Brender and Drazen (2005). Despite overlapping in spmap code, Lesotho should be
considered as “Other country”.
Figure D.12: High-level democracies at the January 1st, 2015
Legend:
Other countries
Strong democracies
 
Scale 1:110,000,000.
Notes: Level of democracy, regarding methodology of Brender and Drazen (2005).
Figure D.13: Quality of democracy at the January 1st, 2015
Legend:
Other countries
Strong democracies
Established democracies
Strong & Established democracies
 
Scale 1:110,000,000.
Notes: Age and level of democracy regarding methodology of Brender and Drazen (2005). Despite overlapping in spmap code, Lesotho should
be considered as “Other country”.
Figure D.14: Political regime at the January 1st, 2015
Legend:
Authoritarian countries or failed
Young democracies
Strong democracies
Established democracies
Strong & Established democracies
 
Scale 1:110,000,000.
Notes: Age and level of democracy regarding methodology of Brender and Drazen (2005). To split between authoritarian countries, and
democratic states, we consider positive polity2 index, but also Cheibub et al. (2010), and Boix et al. (2013), for uncovered countries. Despite
overlapping in spmap code, Lesotho should be considered as “Young democracy”.
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